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ABSTRACT
The Workplace Relations and other Legislation Amendment Act 1996
attempts to expedite reform of the industrial relations system and increase
flexibility of workplaces seeking to compete in the international market
place. This paper provides a detailed guide to the legislation with a
particular focus on its likely impact on Indigenous workers. The potential
equity concerns arising from the operationalisation of the provisions of the
Act should be weighed against the potential employment gains from
improved macroeconomic performance or the increased flexibility of
workplaces. Unfortunately, the lack of data on the articulation of the
interests of Indigenous workers within the industrial relations system
severely limits the depth of the analysis. Notwithstanding such
shortcomings, the entrenched disadvantage experienced by Indigenous
workers means that they may not be in a position to avail themselves of
any employment gains in the widercommunity.
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Introduction
Since Federation, wage bargaining in Australia's formal labour market has
been highly centralised. Many of the wages and conditions enjoyed by
Australian workers have been negotiated by representatives of
governments, employer groups or trade unions under the auspices of the
Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) or its antecedents and
counterparts in the state jurisdictions. Even the enterprise bargaining
reforms designed by the previous Labor Government to introduce some
flexibility of wages and conditions have been largely monitored and
regulated by the AIRC.
The Howard Government recently enacted legislation which attempts to
expedite reform of the industrial relations system and increase flexibility of
workplaces seeking to compete in the international market place. The
Workplace Relations and other Legislation Amendment Act 1996 (WROLA
Act) received royal assent on 25 November 1996. Most schedules of the
Act came into effect at the beginning of 1997, with provisions relating to
Australian workplace agreements likely to come into effect in the first half
of 1997.
The WROLA Act does not attempt to decentralise the industrial relations
system directly. The AIRC retains a significant role in overseeing its
operation. The Act, however, seeks to simplify the award system by
removing overly prescriptive conditions which may hamper workplace
flexibility, facilitating the capacity for local agreements and reducing the
power of trade unions. The Commonwealth Government hopes that these
reforms will improve microeconomic efficiency in Australia's labour
markets and therefore lead to improved macroeconomic outcomes
including significant reductions in unemployment and improved
employment growth. While the overall performance of the economy has
clear implications for any group of workers, this paper focuses on the
likely impact of the reforms on the Indigenous workforce rather than
examining possible macroeconomic outcomes in any detail.
The WROLA Act is likely to have a particular impact on Indigenous
employees. For example, the Act includes a range of provisions intended to
help prevent and eliminate discrimination, including on grounds
particularly relevant to Indigenous workers such as race, colour and social
origin. Such provisions are included in the principal object of the
Workplace Relations Act 1996, as well as in provisions relating to awards,
agreements, and termination of employment.
The impact of more general provisions of the WROLA Act are more
problematic. Amendments of particular concern to Indigenous employees
fall into the broad areas of award simplification, agreement-making,
termination of employment and union rights. This paper summarises the
major features of the WROLA Act of concern to Indigenous employees
and provides an a priori analysis of its implications for the Indigenous
workforce. To ensure that the analysis can be placed in an appropriate
historical context, it is also important to summarise the relevant
characteristics of the Indigenous workforce.
Indigenous workers and the industrial relations system
The articulation of the interests of Indigenous workers within the industrial
relations system is not well documented. The general lack of
documentation does not reflect poor scholarship as much as it does the
historical exclusion of Indigenous workers from the industrial relations
system and the general marginalisation of Indigenous people within
Australian society. For the first 60 years of Federation, Indigenous workers
were largely excluded from the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth
Arbitration Court by default (Stevens 1974: 190).'
One prominent exception is the extensively studied industrial struggle over
equal pay in the pastoral industry in the late 1960s (Stevens 1974; Kerr
1986; May 1994). The Northern Australian Workers Union and the
Commonwealth Government successfully applied to amend the Northern
Territory Cattle Industry Award so that Aboriginal station hands were paid
the same as white workers. The subsequent decline in Aboriginal
participation in the pastoral industry has been attributed to the employment
effects of the subsequent increases in Aboriginal wages (Kerr 1986), but
can just as easily be put down to technological changes in the sector or
inaccurate and discriminatory employer assessments of Aboriginal
workers' work ethics or skills.
Most contemporary studies suffer from difficulties in sampling an
extremely small population of Indigenous workers. Buultjens (1995) found,
using a sample of only 42 respondents, that most Indigenous workers had
little knowledge of agreements or awards. Even the Department of
Industrial Relations' (DIR) study of agreements made under their enterprise
bargaining reforms was circumspect in making definitive judgments about
Indigenous involvement in the industrial relations system because of the
sampling problems in a small population (DIR 1995: 56). Notwithstanding
this poverty of data, it is possible to construct a profile of the likely
interactions between Indigenous workers and the industrial relations
system using a mixture of existing data about the nature of the Indigenous
workforce and a priori analysis.
The historical exclusion of Indigenous Australians from the mainstream
institutions of Australian society, including the award system, may insulate
Indigenous workers, to some extent, from some of the impacts of the
WROLA Act. Indeed, if Indigenous people are not covered by awards, then
simplifying awards will not affect Indigenous employment outcomes.
Given that many Indigenous organisations have historically not been
covered by awards for their Indigenous (and non-Indigenous) staff, the
award system cannot be considered a binding constraint on such
Indigenous employment.2
An associated issue is the extent to which Indigenous Australians are
outside mainstream labour markets and therefore outside the award system.
Of particular relevance to this issue are those in informal employment,
such as artefact manufacture or subsistence activities (Altman and Allen
1992; Smith and Roach 1996).
The Indigenous workforce is highly segregated into a few industries. One
implication of the high level of segmentation is that they are more
vulnerable to changes in these sectors. A case in point is the community
services sector. In 1991, 27.7 per cent of Indigenous males and 46.8 per
cent of female employees were employed in this sector (Taylor and Liu
1996). As for all service industries, measuring productivity is extremely
hard due to the difficulty in quantifying output. Thus, the high participation
of Indigenous people in this sector, which if often a conscious choice,
makes it difficult to apply performance-linked awards or agreements. To
the extent that wage increases are increasingly linked to workplace
performance and productivity, a key goal of the Government's industrial
relations reforms, the potential outcome of such a choice may be that the
average wages and salaries of Indigenous Australians, compared to the
total population, are eroded over time. A related issue is the relative
concentration of Indigenous Australians in the public sector. Hammond
and Harbridge (1995: 374) argue that the decentralisation of bargaining
embodied in the WROLA Act risks worsening the 'structural inequalities of
industry segmentation'.
Indigenous employment is also concentrated in the low-skilled end of
the labour market where there are many persons who could take
their jobs (Altman and Daly 1995). While there has been an improvement
in the skill base of the Indigenous workforce in recent years, a general
decline in the demand for unskilled and other workers with low education
has maintained the relative disadvantage of Indigenous workers in the
labour market.3 That is, the improvements in the skill base were necessary
to ensure that employment prospects of Indigenous workers did not
decline.
Very little is currently known about Indigenous participation in the union
movement.4 Irrespective of the overall coverage of Indigenous workers in
the union movement, the small numbers of Indigenous employees in the
overall workforce and the concentration in disadvantaged segments of the
labour market means that Indigenous workers tend to have limited
bargaining power within the industrial relations system.
To the extent that Indigenous employees have less bargaining power than
other employees, they may be placed at a further disadvantage in
negotiating workplace agreements under the WROLA Act. The possible
exception to the poor bargaining position are Indigenous organisations
which could be expected to be sympathetic to the cultural needs of their
workforce.
The Community Development Employment Projects (CDEP) scheme and
the new industrial relations environment
The CDEP scheme is a major employer of Indigenous workers with about
28 per cent of Indigenous workers or over 19,000 people currently
employed in the scheme (Hunter and Taylor 1996). The position of the
CDEP scheme within the industrial relations system has important
implications for this analysis. Deloitte Ross Tohmatsu (1992) demonstrated
that there were important differences in the treatment of CDEP and non-
CDEP employees. For example, in some Indigenous organisations CDEP
and non-CDEP employees worked together, non-CDEP workers often
being covered by awards. While provisions for annual leave and sick leave
were similar, no specific provisions for casual pay loadings, maternity,
long-service and bereavement leave were identified for CDEP workers.
Overtime was not paid to CDEP workers; however, they were granted time
off work in lieu of overtime. General payments, such as time-and-a-half
and double-time provisions available under the award, were not extended
to CDEP scheme workers. There are also striking differences between
employment conditions for CDEP scheme workers and general award
employees relating to termination, redundancy and superannuation
payments (Altman and Sanders 1991). Superannuation is also not provided
for employees participating in the CDEP scheme.
The differences in the rates of pay among CDEP scheme and award
workers arise mainly from the origins of the scheme as a work-for-the-dole
scheme. CDEP wages are determined by the block grants to communities
participating in the scheme and are notionally linked to the welfare benefit
entitlements of individuals broadly adjusted for demographic
characteristics, such as marital status and number of dependants. The
Deloitte Ross Tohmatsu (1992) report that the average hourly rate of pay
for CDEP scheme workers in construction and maintenance was $8.73
compared to $8.78 for relevant award comparisons. Notwithstanding this
apparently small wage differential, one of the key issues is the limited
number of hours available for work under the CDEP scheme with many
workers constrained to working less than 20 hours per week (Altman and
Hawke 1993). Another major issue from an industrial relations perspective
is the poor access to the employment conditions enjoyed by other workers.
There are no easy answers to these issues and one's position depends on the
extent to which one considers CDEP workers as employees rather than
welfare recipients.
These differentials may act as an incentive for employers to transfer
individuals from one employment scheme to another based upon these
considerations. Altman and Sanders (1991) have expressed concern that the
CDEP scheme has the potential to create secondary labour markets. If the
situation of differential treatment between award covered employees and
CDEP workers continues to exist, it is possible that the scheme (which has
many social externalities) may become a target for criticism from groups
identifying CDEP as supporting the relatively poor pay structure of
Indigenous Australians (Altman and Hawke 1993). The new WROLA Act
may lessen the differential between CDEP scheme and other workers by
enabling analogous award workers to use some of their wages and
conditions as a bargaining tool. However, given repeated assurances from
the coalition Government that no worker will be worse off, the differential
treatment of CDEP and award workers may persist unless, as seems
unlikely, CDEP workers wages are increased in line with other workers in
the workplace.
Enterprise bargaining and Indigenous employees
The most detailed study of the articulation of Indigenous interests within
the industrial relations system was commissioned by the DIR (DIR 1996).
The focus group research examined the extent of Indigenous participation
in enterprise bargaining within three Darwin organisations. These focus
groups were supplemented by interviews with Indigenous workers,
Aboriginal liaison officers, the Northern Land Council, the Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC), managers and union
delegates. Notwithstanding the relatively small size of the research project,
the research found that Indigenous workers played little or no part in
enterprise bargaining (DIR 1996: 176-78). For the non-Indigenous
organisations in the DIR study, Indigenous workers were isolated and few
in number. Employers in such organisations argue that 'we treat everyone
the same here' and do not see a requirement for a special effort to involve
Indigenous workers in the bargaining process. Even in Indigenous
organisations, Indigenous workers had limited involvement in the process
(DIR 1996: 177).
A number of factors worked against Indigenous involvement in enterprise
bargaining. The fear of losing special Aboriginal award conditions which
exceed community standards and the high turnover of Indigenous workers
inhibited participation in the bargaining process. The geographical
isolation of Indigenous organisations from industrial relations support
services provided by government, employers and unions mitigated against
Indigenous participation.5 Also, the tardiness of employers in informing
workers of bargaining developments combined with the tendency of many
Indigenous workers to dislike expressing disagreements in front of
managements tended to ensure minimal Indigenous involvement in the
process (DIR 1996: 177-78).
It should not be surprising that none of the agreements in non-Indigenous
organisations contained clauses which specifically address issues pertinent
to Indigenous workers. Management discretion and informal arrangements
remain the only avenues for addressing issues such as ceremonial leave and
attended family compassionate leave. The consensus among the
respondents in the study was that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
workers would be no better and no worse off under enterprise bargaining
relative to other employees (DIR 1996: 178).
The movement-to-award program
One recent attempt to specifically deal with Indigenous interests in the
industrial relations system was the movement-to-award program.6 The
program was set up in 1992 to support the extension of appropriate awards
to Commonwealth-funded Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
organisations and sectors of the community service industry. The
movement-to-award program guidelines specified several matters of
special interest to Indigenous workers that could be included, including:
compassionate/bereavement leave which recognised the extended family
networks of Indigenous employees; unpaid ceremonial leave of up to ten
days over two years; and allowing employees to partake in National
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander observance day activities. It is
probably not surprising that the program only succeeded in securing
awards in a handful of cases given the suspicion about the effects of the
full extension of award coverage among some Indigenous organisations
(Smith 1994: 23).7 Given the limited success of the movement-to-award
wages program, workplace agreements reached under the WROLA Act
could have the potential to be more successful in ensuring that the
workplace environment is agreeable for Indigenous workers. However, this
potential needs to be balanced by a number of features of the Act that could
act against Indigenous interests. These features are discussed below.
Award simplification process
Awards are to be simplified so that they contain only a limited number of
allowable award matters (s.89A).8 Following the commencement of the
Act, no new awards will be able to include non-allowable award matters
and, after an 18 month transitional process, non-allowable award matters in
existing awards will not be enforceable, but will need to be determined by
agreement at the workplace (Items 46 and 50, Schedule 5, WROLA Act).
While the Act does not prescribe minimum award conditions, it does
specify important restrictions on the issues that can be dealt with under
awards after this transitional phase.
As a result of the Government's agreement with the political party, the
Australian Democrats, which led to the passage of a large number of
amendments to the Bill in the Senate,9 some issues of particular concern, to
Indigenous employees, notably cultural leave, have been included in the
list of allowable matters (s.89A(2)(g)). This concession is potentially
important for many Indigenous employees who have difficulty reconciling
work and cultural commitments. At the time of the National Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Survey (NATSIS) more than one-fifth of Indigenous
employees found that work and cultural obligations were incompatible
(Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 1995).10 However, given that the
current provisions for cultural leave in awards are limited to a few awards
such as the Australian Public Sector General Employment Conditions
award, this concession may have a limited impact on employment
conditions for Indigenous workers.
Matters that could no longer be in awards after the transitional period, but
are of likely to be of relevance to Indigenous employees, include:
• Equal Employment Opportunity and affirmative action provisions;
• provisions relating to workplace harassment;
• provisions relating to employee consultation (including aspects of the
Termination, Change and Redundancy' test case provisions);
• training provisions generally, including literacy provisions;
• study leave;
• authorised slopwork meetings;
• union picnic days;
• trade union training provisions;
• union right of entry provisions;
• occupational health and safety and clothing provisions;
• rest periods; and
• workplace amenities.
EEO and workplace harassment
The first two dot points have important implications for dealing with direct
or indirect discrimination against Indigenous Australians. The NATSIS
provides evidence that racial discrimination is a constraint in finding
employment for just over 4 per cent of Indigenous unemployed (Table 1).
However, the lack of jobs in the local area and insufficient education are
more important factors preventing the Indigenous unemployed finding
work.'' Notwithstanding the relatively small numbers of people reporting
racial discrimination as the primary reason for unemployment, the very
nature of discrimination means that job applicants are unlikely to be aware
of the reasoning processes of potential employers.
Table 1. Main difficulty finding a job by part-of-State and sex, 1994.
Capital city Other urban Rural Males Females Persons
Transport problems
No jobs at all
No jobs in local area
Insufficient education
Own ill health
Racial discrimination
Childcare
Other difficulty
No difficulty
Not stated
Total
22.9
6.9
11.3
20.9
*2.8
*3.0
•1.0
5.7
24.6
*0.8
100.0
14.6
22.6
17.8
20.3
*1.2
5.2
2.6
5.6
9.7
*0.4
100.0
12.9
33.5
25.2
6.4
•1.7
*3.5
*0.3
3.2
11.9
*1.5
100.0
16.4
22.9
19.7
17.9
*1.8
4.3
*0.4
5.7
10.5
*0.3
100.0
16.7
17.7
14.6
16.5
*1.6
4.2
3.4
4.2
19.8
•1.4
100.0
16.5
20.8
17.7
17.4
1.7
4.2
1.6
5.1
14.2
*0.8
100.0
Total ('OOOs) 10,900 20,300 9,000 24,100 16,100 40,200
* These estimates are subject to a high sampling variability.
Source: ABS (1995).
Employee consultation
The exclusion of employee consultation from awards also reduces possible
feedback on the reasons for access to various employment conditions
within the workplace. While some organisations will continue to recognise
the importance of consultative work practices, the removal of provisions on
consultation procedures from awards may mean that, in less progressive
organisations, consultation with employees may not occur. In the context
of Indigenous employees, employers may provide less information on
management decisions relating to issues such as promotions, recruitment,
job redesign and rotation and the provision of employment benefits. This
may mean that employers are able to make discriminatory decisions
without challenge. However, in the case of termination of employment, a
relevant factor in determining whether a termination was harsh, unjust or
unreasonable will include whether there was a valid reason for the
termination, and whether the employee was notified of that reason
(s.!70CG(3)(a) and (b)). This should help to ensure that employees are
consulted about the reasons for decisions to terminate their employment.
Training
The injunction against inclusion of training and literacy provisions or study
leave in awards is likely to have a particularly adverse affect on Indigenous
employees. Given that the poor educational attainment is by far and away
the most significant factor in constraining employment prospects (Hunter
1996), any limitation on educational opportunities within the working
environment can have an especially damaging affect on Indigenous
employees. ABS (1996) identified the completion of training courses as a
significant influence in the ongoing employment opportunities. However,
given the relatively low labour force participation rate among Indigenous
people, limitations on the prescribed level of employer-provided training
may increase the overall competitiveness of Indigenous Australians vis-a-
vis other Australians.
Ability to organise
The next three non-allowable matters relate to the ability of Indigenous
workers to organise and hence the ability to bargain for appropriate
outcomes within the industrial relations system. If, as seems likely,
Indigenous workers are extremely circumscribed in their ability to
organise, either within or outside unions, then the exclusion of these
matters may disproportionately affect Indigenous workers. A detailed
discussion of such matters is left to the second last section of this paper.
Suffice to say that the ability to organise workers to improve their
bargaining provision is a crucial ingredient which determines what
eventually will be included in any bargaining of matters allowed under
the Act.
Occupational health and safety
The listing of the occupational health and safety and clothing provisions,
workplace amenities and rest periods as non-allowable may not affect
workplace conditions to the extent that such issues are covered in other
statutes.12 However, workplace conditions may vary substantially and it is
quite conceivable that there are significant lags between the identification
of localised hazards and legislative response. By rendering such provisions
non-allowable, the Act begs the question of whether legislative responses
are adequate to the threat posed by the hazard.
The likely reduction in prescriptive occupational health and safety
provisions in awards may have a positive employment effect for the
Indigenous workforce if employers can save on unnecessary expenditure.
Such effects need to be weighed against the increased risk associated with
real hazards not accounted for in the relevant statute.
McHugh's (1996) study of the cotton industry in northern New South
Wales provides an alarming analysis of the poor treatment of low skilled
Indigenous workers known as 'chippers'.13 In 1984, almost a third of
Indigenous chippers surveyed reported they had been sprayed with
dangerous chemicals at work. It is not surprising that these chippers had a
high incidence of rashers, blisters, vision problems, giddiness, asthma and
other conditions associated with pesticide poisoning (McHugh 1996: 151).
The failure to look after the interests of these Indigenous workers
illustrates the inadequacies of the statutory regulation of the working
environment and the industrial relations system.14 Nonetheless, the changes
embodied in the WROLA Act remove one avenue for ensuring that
employers comply with their duty of care.
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The AIRC and non-allowable matters
As a result of the agreement with the Democrats, the Act allows the AIRC
to deal with non-allowable matters in a very restricted range of
circumstances. The AIRC can only deal with such matters if:
• there has been a genuine attempt to reach agreement, and there is no
reasonable prospect of agreement being reached on the exceptional
matter by conciliation;
• it is appropriate to settle the matter by arbitration;
• the issues involved are exceptional; and
• a harsh or unjust outcome would apply if the matter was not addressed
(s.89A(7)).
These criteria are so restrictive that they are unlikely to make much of an
impact on the matters that can be addressed in awards. In any case, in the
unlikely circumstance that all four conditions are met, the Indigenous
portion of the workforce is probably so small that the AIRC is unlikely to
bring its limited resources to bear on the more subtle issues underlying the
poor on-going access to employment of Indigenous population.
Complementing the restriction of awards to allowable matters, all
restrictions on the use of particular types of employment will be removed
from awards (s.89(4)(a)). This means that there will be no quotas on the
numbers of employees that can be employed on a casual rather than
permanent basis. Casual employees have little job security, and generally
receive a loading (usually around 20 per cent) on their hourly rate to
compensate them for all employment conditions, such as annual, sick and
other forms of leave. The removal of restrictions on casual employment
will mean that employers are more likely to hire vulnerable employees,
such as Indigenous employees, on a casual basis. Under these
circumstances, Indigenous employment is likely to be increasingly
concentrated in the 'peripheral', rather than the 'core' workforce. As such,
Indigenous employees will have access to few employment benefits, little
job security, and no access to career or training opportunities. However, to
the extent that employers hire additional Indigenous workers as a result of
the removal of these restrictions, Indigenous employment may even
improve. Casual work is probably preferable tounemployment.
In addition to specified restrictions, the AIRC will be required to review all
awards, to determine whether they:
• include matters of detail or process that are more appropriately dealt
with by agreement at the workplace or enterprise level;
• do not prescribe work practices or procedures that restrict or hinder the
efficient performance of work; and
• do not contain provisions that have the effect of restricting or hindering
productivity, having regard to fairness to employees, (items 49(7) and
51(6) Schedule 5, WROLA Act).
Similarly, new awards and variations to awards will not be able to be
approved where they do include such matters (s.!43(lB)). While the
precise application of these provisions will be up to the Australian
Industrial Relations Commission, it is likely that they could lead to the
removal of substantive provisions that provide real benefits to Indigenous
employees from awards. For example, the clear emphasis on efficiency
implies that equity considerations will be a secondary consideration when
there is any trade-off between equity and efficiency. While award reviews
must also address discriminatory provisions and new awards must not
discriminate on grounds including race, colour, and social origin, this is
likely to have little effect on Indigenous workers as few awards would
directly discriminate on such grounds.
Paid rates awards
The new Act also makes significant changes to paid rates awards, that is
awards that specify the actual rate of pay and conditions provided to
employees, as opposed to minimum rates awards, which only specify
minimum pay and conditions, with employers free to pay above this
minimum. Paid rates are common in the public sector where much
Indigenous employment is concentrated, and generally provide a higher
rate of pay than equivalent minimum rates awards, as they incorporate an
element of the 'market rate' that is payed on an over-award basis in the
private sector.
Under the new provisions, the Commission's power to make an award is
limited to making a minimum rates award (s.89A(3)). By application
during an 18 month interim period, and as a requirement after that period,
the AIRC must review all awards. As part of this review, the AIRC may
vary paid rates awards so that they provide for minimum rates of pay
(items 49(5) and 51(4), Schedule 5, WROLA Act).
Under the legislation, the Commission is required to handle such
conversion in a way that ensures that overall entitlements to pay provided
by the award are not reduced by that variation (items 49(6) and 51(5),
Schedule 5, WROLA Act). While the operation of this provision would be
left up to the AIRC, past practice suggests that it would involve identifying
the element of paid rates that reflects an over-award component, and
expressing this as a separate amount that is not subject to any further
increases.15 Thus, while the conversion to minimum rates may not
immediately reduce current rates, it would lead to disadvantage over time
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as the real value of the 'over-award' element is eaten away by inflation.
This is likely to lead to substantial disadvantage for those Indigenous
employees currently covered by paid rates awards in the public sector.
The WROLA Act, as a result of the Government's agreement with the
Democrats, does contain a mechanism by which some employees may be
able to retain their paid rates awards. The AIRC is able to arbitrate an
award for employees previously covered by a paid rates award, where there
is no reasonable prospect of the negotiating parties reaching an agreement,
even if the AIRC conciliates (s.!70MW(7) and 170MX(3)). Such an award
does not have to meet requirements for other awards (s.!70MY(2), but
must have regard to how productivity might be improved in the business
concerned (not usually a specific concern in award-making)
(s.!70MX(5)(d)). Unlike other awards, it must also specify a nominal
expiry date after which the award can be revoked on application by an
employer or organisation bound by the award, or a majority of employees
(s.!70MZ(l) and (5)). The impact that this provision will have on the
retention of paid rates awards remains to be seen, but it is clearly framed
with a view to any arbitrated paid awards operating on a short-term basis,
and only in return for productivity offsets.
Holes in the safety net?
While the treatment of awards under the WROLA Act raises concerns for
Indigenous employees, it should also be noted that new provisions will
require the Australian Industrial Relations Commission to have particular
regard to the needs of the low paid when adjusting the safety net
(s.88B(2)(c)). In its submission to the current Living Wage Case, the
Commonwealth used this provision to argue that safety net increases
should only be granted to employees whose award rates are at or below
Average Weekly Ordinary Time Earnings (AWOTE). The Commonwealth
suggested that this would proportionally benefit Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander people as approximately 84 per cent of such employees in
non-CDEP employment were estimated to be earning at or below AWOTE
in 1994 (Commonwealth of Australia (forthcoming)). Nevertheless, in the
longer term, the Commonwealth's approach means that the award system is
likely to play an increasingly residual role in Australian industrial relations,
which is unlikely to benefit those disadvantaged employees who most rely
on minimum award wages.
The WROLA Act is part of a new phase in Government policy which
emphasises the importance of agreements between enterprises and their
employees. For Indigenous employees, the first element of this policy
phase was seen when the movement-to-award program was scrapped in the
last budget. For this new policy focus to achieve the desired results,
Indigenous workers must be able to obtain suitable and equitable
agreements with local enterprises. While all matters not included in the
awards can be negotiated at a workplace level, achieving a suitable
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outcome depends on the preferences of the Indigenous workforce and the
relative bargaining strength of the respective parties. The next section
examines the role of the agreement-making provisions in the Act.
Agreement-making
Under the new legislation there are provisions for three types of formal
enterprise agreements:
• certified agreements negotiated collectively between unions and
employers;
• certified agreements negotiated on a collective basis directly between
employers and employees; and
• Australian workplace agreements (AWAs) negotiated either collectively
or individually directly with employees, but signed by individual
employees.
The first category of agreement is essentially the same as existing certified
agreements. The last two categories represent a fundamental addition to the
scope for enterprise agreements.
As a result of the Government's agreement with the Democrats, a 'no
disadvantage' test, similar to the test currently applying to federal
agreements will apply to agreements, and all types of agreements will be
subject to upfront vetting (by the AIRC in the case of certified agreements,
and by a new Employment Advocate in the case of AWAs with
agreements).16 Nevertheless, there are a number of features of the new
agreement-making provisions that could put vulnerable employees,
including Indigenous employees, at a disadvantage.
Certified agreements
In the case of certified agreements, the AIRC's responsibility in relation to
vulnerable employees has been reduced. Previously, the AIRC was
required to identify any employees covered by the agreement whose
interest may not have been taken sufficiently into account in the
negotiations for, or the terms of, the agreement. To decide this, the AIRC
was required to find out whether relevant employees were consulted and
informed about the agreement in ways that were appropriate having regard
to their particular circumstances and needs, and whether the effects on the
relevant employees of the terms of the agreement were properly explained
to those employees. Where there was a failure to consult or explain, the
Commission could make whatever orders it thought necessary to remedy
the failure and its effects (formerly S.170MG of the Industrial Relations
Act 1988). This requirement clearly had three parts: identify vulnerable
employees, check that they had been consulted properly, and remedy any
defects.
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Under the new legislation, this requirement has been replaced with a
shorter requirement that the agreement be appropriately explained to
employees, having regard to their particular circumstances and needs
(s.!70LT(7)). The legislation rather nonsensically states that 'An example
of such a case [surely the requirement applies to all cases?] would be
where the persons included: (a) women; or (b) persons from a non-English
speaking background; or (c) young persons'.
The legislation no longer specifically requires the identification of
vulnerable employees. It also refers to 'explanation' rather than
'consultation', implying a one-way process of communication from
employers to employees, rather than a two-way process, where employees
are able to influence an agreement's outcome. Finally, the AIRC's only
alternatives if the agreement does not meet the requirements of s.!70LT(7)
is for it to reject the agreement or accept undertakings or other action at the
initiative of the parties to the agreement. It cannot make orders to remedy
the deficiency itself. In combination, these differences in the new
legislation are likely to undermine the effectiveness of the provisions in
protecting vulnerable employees.
Another weakness in the certified agreements provisions relates to
agreements negotiated directly between employers and employees. An
employer is able to negotiate directly with employees at his or her own
initiative. An employee who is a union member can make a request that
their union represent them, but this can only be in 'meeting and conferring'
with the employer, not with negotiating the agreement itself (s.!70LK(5)).
A union in an area where employees have little bargaining power, likely to
be the case in many areas of Indigenous employment, has no rights to force
an employer to negotiate with it directly.
Australian Workplace Agreements (AWAs)
Despite the provisions governing AWAs being substantially amended as a
result of the agreement between the Democrats and the Government, there
are still a number of deficiencies in the provisions that are likely to
disadvantage many vulnerable employees, including Indigenous
employees.
Unlike certified agreements, AWAs do not include provisions requiring
employers to explain agreements to employees in ways that have regard to
their particular circumstances and needs. The legislation simply requires
the agreement to be explained (s.!70VPA(l)(c)). The Government has
provided no explanation of this difference in approach between certified
agreements and AWAs.
Also unlike certified agreements, there is no requirement for AWAs to be
tested upfront to see whether they contain discriminatory provisions (for
example on the basis of race, colour, social origin or national extraction).
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There is a requirement that AWAs include provisions relating to
discrimination that are prescribed by the regulations (s.!70VG(l)).
However, the requirement for a vague commitment on the part of the
parties to avoid discriminatory practices is unlikely to have the same effect
as an upfront test by a third party. There is no basis for a distinction
between certified agreements and AWAs on this matter.
Despite the use of a 'no disadvantage' test, vulnerable employees are also
likely to be disadvantaged by the introduction of formal individual
contracts, that can change award provisions, into the industrial relations
system. In the past, individual agreements have had to operate over and
above award provisions for employees covered by awards. Now, an
employer can use their bargaining power to force an employee to agree, on
an individual basis, to changes to their award that they may be unhappy
with. This is clear as, despite a requirement that employees genuinely
consent to an agreement (s.!70VPA(l)(d)), there is no prohibition on
employers making agreement to an individual AWA a condition of
employment for new employees.
Also employers have the right to 'lock out' individual employees (that is,
refuse to allow them to work or be paid, without terminating their
employment contract) until they agree to an individual AWA (S.170WC).
This provision appears to be designed to achieve some perverse symmetry
between collective certified agreements - where employers and
unions/employees are provided with the right to collectively strike or lock
out a group of employees in a bargaining period - and AWAs. There
appears to be no regard to the inherent differences in bargaining power in
individual and collective negotiations which are all too apparent for
Indigenous workers in the secondary labour market.
Other provisions stipulate that unions can only operate as 'bargaining
agents' for employees (S.170VK), and cannot be party to an AWA
(s. 170VA). This provision is ironic in the context of comments by the
Government on its intention to provide choice to employees.
Finally, it is relevant to note that, as a result of the Government's
agreements with the Democrats, the Employment Advocate must have
regard to the needs of workers in a disadvantaged bargaining position
(s.83BB) in the performance of its general functions, for example in
providing advice and assistance to employees. The legislation specifically
states that examples of such employees are women, people from
non-English speaking backgrounds, young people, apprentices, trainees
and outworkers. Indigenous employees are not specifically mentioned,
despite the fact that the Government's access and equity policies
purportedly are aimed at increasing access to Government services to both
Indigenous employees and employees from non-English speaking
backgrounds.
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Termination of employment
The Government has made substantial revisions to existing unfair dismissal
provisions, designed to make them less onerous to employers. A number of
the amendments made could act as a disincentive for employees with a
genuine case, but with limited financial resources, from pursuing their
claims, for example, Indigenous employees. In particular, the Commission
can award costs against an employee, not only when a complaint was made
vexatiously or without reasonable cause, but also where it is satisfied that
an employee has acted unreasonably in failing to discontinue the matter
before the Commission or to agree to terms of settlement and, where an
employee elects to proceed to arbitration but then discontinues the matter
(S.170CJ). Regulations also provide that a fee of $50 is payable for
lodgement of an application to the Commission for relief in respect of
termination of employment. However, a registrar may waive the fee if
satisfied that a person lodging an application will suffer serious hardship if
the lodgement fee is paid.
This fee, in conjunction with the widespread ignorance of the industrial
relations system, may mean that Indigenous persons who might have a
successful claim may not lodge it. In this way a cycle of Indigenous
distrust of official institutions is perpetuated.17 While alienation from the
industrial relations system is difficult to quantify, it is potentially an
important constraint on the ability of the system to fulfil its promise. If
Indigenous people do not feel it is in their interest to participate, then they
cannot participate in the bargaining process which determines the final
outcome.
Union rights
A number of restrictions on union rights in the legislation may
disadvantage Indigenous employees, to the extent that they are more reliant
on the activities of unions to prevent exploitation from unscrupulous
employers. These include:
• the fact that unions can only enter an employer's premises to investigate
where the employer is complying with an award, where a union member
is employed at the premises (s.285(B)(2)) (unions have no rights to
inspect premises to ensure compliance with an AWA)). To the extent
that Indigenous employees are less likely to be members of unions, this
means that they have to rely on the Department of Industrial Relations
to ensure compliance in their areas of employment;
• that fact that awards providing unions with rights of entry are made
unenforceable (S.127AA);
• employers are forbidden to pay employees when they are taking
industrial action, which is defined to include partial work bans, where
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employees perform all but a small part of their usual duties (S.187AA
and s.4); and
• provisions are made for enterprise unions of 50 or more employees
(s. 189(4)). This may result in fragmented and under-resourced unions
which cannot adequately represent employees.
While the evidence about the extent to which Indigenous employees are
adequately represented by the unions is limited, it is clear that the WROLA
Act will hinder the legitimate activities of unions including the
representation of Indigenous workers who have experienced discrimination
in the workplace on the basis of race. However, the limited ability of
unions to cover workers in remote and rural location means that such
constraints will be largely confined to urban areas.
Notwithstanding the shortcomings of the Act, the somewhat inglorious
history of certain elements of the union movement with respect to
Indigenous workers means that we should not be too romantic about the
prospect for union activity eliminating racial discrimination in the
workplace (see footnote 1).
Concluding remarks
The WROLA Act will change the environment in which industrial relations
is conducted in Australia and therefore will have profound implications for
the employment conditions of all Indigenous workers. However, as
indicated above, it should be recognised that many Indigenous workers are
not covered by awards. This is particularly true among remote
communities and in Indigenous organisations. The restrictions imposed on
what can be included in awards in the WROLA Act are not likely to
constrain the conditions of employment for such workers. Notwithstanding,
we cannot discount the possibility that other workers will be adversely
affected by the award simplification process, particularly non-CDEP
employees in urban areas where the relative ease of organising union
members may mean that more Indigenous workers are covered
by awards.
The role of unions in Indigenous industrial relations?
The WROLA Act severely circumscribes the role of unions in the
industrial relations system. Eichbaum (1997) suggests that this aspect of
the Act may be inconsistent with the International Labour Organisation
conventions on freedom of association and collective bargaining.18
Notwithstanding any such inconsistency, the Act will obstruct unions
fulfilling their legitimate role in looking after the interests of Indigenous
workers.
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The deep-seated factors underlying the poor labour market performance of
Indigenous Australians means mat the trade union movement can only play
a limited role in facilitating improvement, especially in the immediate
future (Altman and Hawke 1993). While the attempt to curtail union power
may have a limited impact on overall employment outcomes and wages for
Indigenous workers, it may affect the terms and conditions of individual
workers. Indeed, if unprosecuted discrimination against Indigenous
workers is widespread and systematic, then the adverse employment effect
of reducing unions' role in pursuing employers who discriminate on the
basis of race, may outweigh the positive employment impacts of increased
flexibility in wages and conditions.
Unions could play a vital role in assisting the entrance of Indigenous
people into the formal labour market and attempting to ensure that an over-
segregated labour market does not develop (Altman and Hawke 1993).
However, if unions genuinely wish to represent the interests of Indigenous
workers they must encourage effective Indigenous participation in the
formulation of union goals and objectives. To remain relevant in the new
industrial relations environment unions must actively service the needs of
all their potential members, including Indigenous workers.
In order to service Indigenous members, unions must systematically collect
information about such members. The absence of any such database in the
public sector unions, where many Indigenous workers are employed,
highlights the historical failure of unions to adequately service Indigenous
members.
The employment effects of the WROLA Act
Given that employment demand is one of the major factors constraining the
Indigenous unemployed from securing employment, the employment
effects of the Act are potentially very important (see Table 1). The
relatively flexible industrial relations environment has some potential to
reduce the cost to employers of workforce expansion. However, the
protections in the Act which constrain the reduction of wages will limit the
actual cost saving that can be achieved by employers and therefore the
potential size of any employment effect. In any case, as Gregory (1993: 65)
points out, unacceptably large reductions in wages may be required to
achieve the increases in employment necessary to restore the economy to
full employment.19
There are two Indigenous-specific constraints on the size of these
employment effects: the geographic distribution of the Indigenous
population and the skill base of its workforce. Even if the employment
effects are substantial in major urban areas, this will not affect the majority
of the Indigenous workforce in rural and other urban areas. The relatively
low educational attainment of the Indigenous workforce means that they
may not be competitive against other potential employees (Hunter 1996).
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That is, whatever the employment effects of the Act there is likely to be a
persistent problem with a mismatch of supply and demand for Indigenous
labour. Indigenous unemployment that can only effectively be addressed
by a menu of policies which simultaneously address both supply and
demand factors.
The possibility of improved employment for Indigenous workers must be
weighed against potential equity implications of increased enterprise
flexibility. If society values equity in the wages and conditions under
which workers are employed, then we need to explicitly recognise the
trade-off between these equity considerations and possible employment
opportunities. However, even if equity considerations are ignored entirely,
it is possible that the employment losses for Indigenous workers from
unprosecuted racial discrimination resulting from the changes to the
conditions under which employers hire and fire may outweigh potential
gains from improvements in macroeconomic growth.
Notes
1. In 1932, the Court ruled that, as the Federal award did not mention Aborigines,
they could not join the Australian Workers Union. The Court explicitly excluded
'natives' from its jurisdiction in 1944 (Stevens 1974: 190-1). The Australian
Workers Union had attempted to exclude blacks from their ranks as early as the
1910s (May 1994: 160).
2. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) (1991) notes:
The situation now exists where some organisations have acted to implement effective
award coverage for their own operations, in the process setting potential precedents for
other areas. Others operate in terms of fixing wages and conditions by reference to a wide
range of Common Rule awards that may be remote from and inappropriate to their
operations, and further, a significant proportion of organisations appear to be effectively
award free, with wages and conditions for employees set quite arbitrarily.
3. Katz and Murphy (1992) documented the international nature of the decline for
unskilled labour.
4. Several unions have moved to rectify the lack of information about Indigenous
union membership and encourage greater participation in the union movement.
For example, the Australian Education Union has made moves to estimate the
number of Indigenous members and actively include these members in the union.
5. The Kimberley region was mentioned as a specific case where geographic
isolation had inhibited the pursuit of enterprise bargaining.
6. The funding for the movement-to-award program was stopped in 1996.
7. ATSIC (1995) estimate that only two new awards were developed and
implemented in 1994-95 under the movement-to-award program. The program
expenditure for that year was $300,687.
8. Unless otherwise indicated, section numbers refer to sections of the Workplace
Relations Act 1996, as amended by the WROLA Act.
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9. See Agreement Between the Commonwealth Government and the Australian
Democrats on the Workplace Relations Bill - Agreed Statement of Position,
October 1996.
10. The difficulty in reconciling work with cultural obligations is particularly
pronounced among non-CDEP scheme employees. Of these employees, 25.1 per
cent recognised that there was an incompatibility between their work and cultural
obligations. Another 29.6 per cent indicated that they did not have any cultural
obligations.
11. Demand-related factors account for more than 50 per cent of problems in finding
employment in rural and remote areas.
12. That is, the respective State and Federal laws pertaining to occupational health
and safety.
13. Chippers move through rows of cotton removing weeds so that the picked cotton
will be free of weed and therefore fetch a higher price in the market. As many as
90 per cent of chippers in northern New South Wales (NSW) are Indigenous.
14. The NSW Department of Agriculture's Drugs and Poisons Schedule Committee
set the allowable exposure limit at 0.1 mg/kg of the pesticide, chlordimeform,
metabolites in a 48-hour pooled urine sample. When the authorities discovered
that this was being exceeded in the first season, they simply doubled the allowable
limit (McHugh 1996: 138).
15. This is consistent with the Commonwealth's submission in the current hearings on
the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU's) living wage claim.
16. Where there is some doubt that the 'no disadvantage' test is met, AWAs may still
be referred to the AIRC
17. Henderson (1975: 267) provides extensive documentation of extensive distrust in
white bureaucracies.
18. Haworth and Hughes (1995: 154) express similar concerns about New Zealand's
Employment Contract Act.
19. Foregoing wage increases experienced in the growing sectors of the economy is a
viable option for employment improvements in the more sluggish sectors in the
long term (see Gregory 1993).
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